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Two Essays on Corporate Governance⎯ Are Local Directors Better Monitors,  
and Directors Incentives and Earnings Management 
 
Hong Wan 
ABSTRACT 
 
Previous literature have documented that the independent directors play a crucial 
goal in corporate governance but the research on the firm value and board independence 
remains inconclusive. In my dissertation, I examine the impact of independent directors’ 
geographic proximity to corporate headquarters on the effectiveness of corporate boards and 
the motivations of board directors. Using a large sample of directors trading, I show that 
independent directors who live close to headquarters (“local director”) earn higher abnormal 
returns on their trades than other directors, and that this advantage is stronger in small firms. 
Further, I find an inverse relationship between the number of local independent directors on 
the board and firm value. Companies with fewer local independent directors also have higher 
ROA ratios, lower abnormal CEO compensations, and higher CEO incentive compensations. 
Collectively, the findings suggest that local independent directors are more informed but less 
effective monitors.  I also provided evidence that firms with a higher proportion of directors’ 
incentive compensation are more likely to manage earnings. Directors are more likely to 
exercise options in the year following the firms’ earnings management being in the top 
  vi  
 
tercile of the sample. The results are robust after controlling for self-selection bias. Taken 
together, the evidence suggests that director incentive pay is more likely to align directors’ 
interest with the CEO’s, rather than to induce the directors to act in the best interest of the 
shareholders. 
  1  
 
 
 
Essay 1⎯ Are Local Directors Better Monitors 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Board independence is an important mechanism of corporate governance. 
Independent directors are elected to oversee the managers and act in the best interests of 
stockholders.  Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) focus on the outside directors’ role 
as monitors and emphasize that independent directors have incentives to build their 
reputation as expert monitors. Since then, a series of corporate scandals have led to changes 
in laws and regulations that are aimed at enhancing board independence.  
According to the National Association of Corporate Directors, in 2005, 83% of 
boards consisted of a majority of independent directors, up from 54% in 2000. However, in 
spite of the crucial function of independent directors as monitors, the evidence on the 
relationship between board independence and firm value remains inconclusive. For example, 
Aggrawal and Willamson (2006) find that the fraction of independent directors on the board 
has a positive impact on firm’s Q. However, Hermalin and Wissbach (1991) show an 
insignificant relationship between board independence and firm performance, while 
Yermack (1996), Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (2002) find a negative relationship.  
Two possible reasons for the mixed evidence have been suggested in the literature. 
First, it is unclear what constitutes director independence. The literature defines independent 
directors by their affiliation. However, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and others argue that 
being unaffiliated does not necessarily mean being independent. Second, while the board’s 
function is to monitor the CEOs, the CEO most always determines the agenda of board 
meetings and the information given to the board (Jensen (1993)). Consequently he may be 
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able to keep the board in the dark whenever he wants to make decisions that may harm the 
shareholders. Adams and Ferreira (2007) also present a model wherein the CEO is less likely 
to share information with directors when the board is monitoring intensively.  
To shed new light on this issue, I examine board effectiveness by considering a new 
dimension of board independence: proximity of board members to the corporate 
headquarters, and hence to the CEOs. My primary focus in this paper is on the relationship 
between geographic proximity of independent directors and board effectiveness. I propose 
two contending hypotheses to explain this association. The first proposes that board 
effectiveness rises with the proportion of the board that is made up of local independent 
directors (“local director”). I call this the efficiency hypothesis. An alternative hypothesis is 
that local directors, because of their proximity to the firm’s CEO and other executives, may 
be less effective monitors. In other words, more geographically proximate directors may be 
less objective and hence reduces board effectiveness. I call this the entrenchment hypothesis.  
In support of the first hypothesis, many studies have documented that geographic 
proximity is an important component of monitoring activities. For example, geographic 
proximity determines the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms within bank holding 
companies (Berger and DeYoung (2001, 2002)), and the representation of venture capitalists 
on the boards of U.S. private firms (Lerner (1995)). Physical closeness to the firm further 
influences activities of equity analyst and auditors. Malloy (2005) shows that equity analysts 
forecast local stocks more accurately and that their forecast revisions for the local stock have 
a strong effect on the market, suggesting that local equity analysts have information 
advantage over distant analysts. Moreover, Malloy (2005) documents that the underwriter 
affiliated analyst biases are only observed for the distant affiliated analysts. Choi et al. 
(2007) find that local auditors provide higher quality auditing services while charging lower 
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auditing fees. Like in the case of external monitors, such as banks, auditors and analysts, the 
director locality or geographic proximity to the firm is more likely to be associated with an 
information advantage that could lead to a more effective board. Local directors may, for 
example observe more firm operations, be aware of more news about the firm in the local 
media, have first-hand knowledge about the firm from their local sources, or have a better 
understanding of the local industry conditions. 
On the other hand, local directors may be weak monitors. Proximity to the firms is 
more likely to be associated with more personal ties with the firm managers. This is because 
both CEO and directors are, for example, likely to serve on other local boards, charitable 
institutions and to attend the same country clubs. These interactions may lead to the 
development of social and/or personal bonds between the directors and CEOs and may 
compromise local directors’ objectivity.  
Consequently, one can argue that the presence of local independent directors on the 
board could make the board either more effective or more entrenched. The information 
advantage, if available, would allow the local independent directors to monitor more 
effectively, and thus lead to better firm performance. On the other side of the coin, more 
frequent social interactions with the CEO may impair the independence of local directors. 
This, in turn, may lead to a misalignment of directors’ and shareholders’ interest.  
It is reasonable for local independent directors to be more concerned about local 
issues and persons with whom they interact more frequently. Additionally, CEOs are more 
visible in the local community and, consequently, local independent directors are also more 
likely to weigh the implications of board decisions on their social standing. Social 
considerations of local independent directors may lead to a conflict of interests with 
shareholders. Local independent directors are therefore more likely to place emphasis on 
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“politeness and candor at the expense of frankness and truth” (Jensen (1993)) in the 
functions as members of the board.  Therefore, the presence of local independent directors 
could lead to a weaker board and poor firm performance.  
Given the two opposite hypothesized relationships between local independent 
directors and firm performance, there are several natural empirical questions that can be 
addressed: are local independent directors more informed than other directors? Do firms that 
have more local independent directors perform better or worse than firms that have more 
geographically distant independent directors? Does the geographic dispersion of the 
independent directors affect board decision-making, such as setting up CEO compensation? 
In this study, I find addresses of directors for S&P 1500 firms for the years 1996 to 
2004 and compute the distance between the home address and corporate headquarters for 
each director. The director is identified as local if they live within a 50 miles radius from 
corporate headquarters. First, I use the performance of directors’ trades in the stock of the 
firm on whose board they serve as a proxy of potential information advantage. I collect all 
the director trades from Thomas Financial Insider Trading Database and compute the return 
for each director trade by mimicking their positions. Among all trades, I only investigate 
purchase trades as they are more informative compared with sales trades (Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001)). By comparing the profits from the trades of local directors and non-local 
directors, I reveal that the local directors trades overall outperform the non-local directors 
trades. Specifically, over a one-year horizon, the local independent directors’ trades have an 
average cumulative return of 25.3% versus 21.3% for the non-local directors. After adjusting 
by the value-weighted market index, the difference between the local directors’ trades and 
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non-local director trades is about 3.8%1. 
I further explore the issue by sorting the trades by firm characteristics. If the local 
directors have an information advantage over their distant counterparts, it is reasonable to 
expect that the advantage will be stronger for firms with high levels of information 
asymmetry. Indeed, I find the difference on the trades by local and non-local independent 
directors is strongest for the smallest size tercile or the group of firms that have the fewest 
analysts following. Local directors of firms belonging to the smallest tercile earn a 7.72% 
higher cumulative market adjusted return over a one-year horizon compared to the non-local 
counterparts. However the return difference drops to 1.56% in large size tercile and becomes 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level. 
Next, I investigate whether the majority of local independent directors on the board 
enhance board effectiveness, i.e. leads to better firm performance. The analysis shows an 
inverse relationship between the proportion of local independent directors and firm value and 
ROA, respectively. This suggests that the presence of local independent directors has a 
negative impact on board effectiveness and lends support to the idea that local directors are 
less effective monitors and more likely to side with the CEOs. 
Finally, I investigate whether the proportion of local independent directors affect the 
pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation and the total compensation CEO 
received. I find that CEOs of firms with 100% non-local independent directors receive a 
lower total compensation than the median number in industry.  
 This paper contributes to the literature in at least three research areas: (1) To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first paper that links directors’ geographic proximity to the firm  
                                                 
1 It is possible that this reflects only the advantage of being local investors, rather than being more informed 
local directors with access to the CEOs. 
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(i.e. the CEOs), and their monitoring role. Previous literature has focused on various board 
characteristics and firm performance, but has failed to identify director locality as a factor 
that affects board effectiveness. (2) This study sheds light on the tradeoff between having 
more geographically proximate and more potentially informed independent directors and 
having directors that are less informed but more objective due to their distance. Recognizing 
that even unaffiliated, but geographically proximate, directors may not exercise sufficient 
independence has important implications for both corporate and the mutual fund boards in 
light of recent legal proposals that have sought to make boards more independent2. The 
classification of directors as independent based on affiliation alone has been previously 
criticized. This study provides novel evidence that independent, i.e. local but unaffiliated, 
directors’ behavior is not always in line with the best interest of the shareholders. The 
evidence suggests that adding geographic proximity to the CEO to the selection criteria for 
director may improve shareholder values. (3) This study also contributes to the growing 
literature on the importance of geography on economics by demonstrating that local 
independent director trades are more profitable than those of their non-local counterparts.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Hypotheses are developed in 
section I. Section II contains the data selection process and descriptive statistics. Section III 
provides the results. Section IV presents additional robustness tests and section V concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 For example, in 2002 NYSE and NASD have a rule change to require that a majority of a listed firm’s 
board be made up of “independent directors”.  Detail of this rule can be found at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm. 
  7  
 
Geography and Director Independence: Background 
Distance and Information 
Previous research has documented that geographical proximity is of importance for 
investors. The literature has shown that local investors earn, on average, higher returns 
compared to remote investors. For instance, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) examine the 
returns of a large number of individual investors using data from 1991 to 1996 obtained from  
a discount broker and find that households exhibit a strong preference for local investments. 
The average household earns an additional annualized return of 3.2% from its local holdings 
relative to its non-local holdings, suggesting that local investors can exploit local knowledge. 
Excess returns to investing locally are even larger, about 6%, among stocks not in the S&P 
500 index. 
Mutual funds also earn a higher return on holding local stocks than remote stocks. 
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) separate mutual fund holdings into local and distant stocks. 
Local stocks that are held by the mutual funds earn a higher return than the local stocks that 
are not held by mutual funds. Moreover, turnover of the local stocks is less frequent than that 
of non-local stocks. Local firms held by mutual funds tend to be small and highly leveraged. 
Coval and Moskwitz (2001) suggest that stocks of firms with these kinds of characteristics 
are the ones in which local investors have a greater information advantage. Further evidence 
of the local information advantage comes from equity analyst and investment bank studies. 
For example, Malloy (2005) finds that local analysts provide more accurate earnings forecast 
and that their forecast revisions have a greater impact on the market. Butler(2007) shows that 
local investment banks have better access to “soft” information and have absolute and 
comparative advantage to place low-rated bonds. By employing a large sample of municipal 
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bond offerings from 1997 to 2001, he finds that for per credit rating notch of the bond, the 
increase in all-in cost (yield plus investment banking fee) is approximately 4.4 basis points if 
the bond is underwritten by local investment banks compared with 18.7 basis points if 
underwritten by non-local investment banks.  
In the same vein, local directors might have their own information advantage over 
directors who are residing far away from the corporate headquarters. If the local directors 
possess better information, I could expect that, on average, their trades will yield higher 
positive abnormal returns than that of their remote counterparts. Furthermore, it would also 
be reasonable to expect that the local information advantage would decrease with firm 
transparency. Large firms with greater analysts following and /or firms in the urban area 
would be less likely to exhibit local information advantages. Based on the above, I propose 
the following hypothesis on the information advantage associated with local directors.  
H1: Local directors have an information advantage over non-local directors and the 
advantage is stronger in firms with higher information asymmetry.  
 
Distance and Monitoring 
Naturally, the next question to ask is how geographic proximity of independent 
directors may affect firm value. Many other studies have documented other attributes of the 
board that are related to firm value. For instance, Yermack (1996) finds that the size of the 
board is negatively related to firm value. Vafeas(1999) finds that board meeting frequency is 
negatively related to Tobin’s Q.  Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) find there is a 
positive link between firm performance and the number of board seats a director holds while 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show that firms with busy boards, i.e. those in with a majority of 
outside directors holding three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate 
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governance, exhibiting lower market-to-book ratios and weaker profitability.  Over a wide 
range of issues, all management has to do to capture the board is to present information in a 
way that is likely to generate support for its perspectives, or in a selective way, to achieve 
effective capture of the board. In a model developed by Adams and Ferreira (2007), the CEO 
is less likely to share information with directors when the board is monitoring intensively. If 
the managers want to act against the shareholders’ interest, they can simply keep the 
directors in the dark. Geographic proximity enables the local directors to have more 
information advantage over the remote directors. In this sense, the board could become more 
effective if the majority of outside directors are local. Therefore, I want to examine the 
interplay between the effectiveness of the board and local directors. 
In contrast, local independent directors are more likely to have greater levels of social 
interaction with the managers. This friendly interaction makes local directors less likely to 
challenge managers. Landier, Nair and Wulf (2006) have shown that the proximity to 
headquarter affects the managerial concerns to their employees at different divisions. By 
using a firm division level data, they show that divisions that are closer to firm headquarter 
are less likely to experience layoffs. Thus, under this alternative view, geographic proximity 
could cause local independent directors to work less effectively in the board. 
Based on the above, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Geographic proximity does not affect firm value, other things equal. The firm 
that has a greater proportion of local independent directors is not systematically different 
from the firms that have few local independent directors.  
 
Director Locality and CEO Compensation 
The board of directors is the primary internal corporate governance mechanism 
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responsible for setting management compensation and monitoring senior management 
(Jensen (1993)). It has been considered to play an important role in setting an effective 
incentive contract structure that alleviates agency problems arising from the separation of 
ownership and control (Murpey(1999), Cory, Guay and Larker(2001)). If boards with more 
local independent directors act more effectively because locals are better informed, then 
companies with such boards will favor lower non-incentive pay (such as cash compensation) 
and higher pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. However, the opposite effect 
may hold if the proximity of the directors’ residence compromises their objectivity. In that 
case, the local independent directors may be less likely to challenge the CEO in 
compensation matter in the board. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis.  
H3: The director geographic proximity does not systematically affect CEO 
compensation and there is no systematic difference in CEO total compensation and CEO 
incentive compensation and performance between firms with board dominated by local 
directors and other things being equal. 
 
 
Data and Variable Constructions 
Sample Selection 
The databases used in this study are CRSP, Compustat, IRRC, ExecuComp, I/B/E/S, 
and Insider Trading. The IRRC database covers board director information for S&P 1500 
firms for the period 1996-2004. For each director in the database, I identify her home address 
from her report on their insider trading to the SEC. For the directors who change their home 
address at a given year, I pick the address that is closer to the annual board meeting date. The 
stock return of the firm is retrieved from CRSP database while the accounting information is 
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from Compustat database. 
 
Variables 
Distance is defined as the number of miles from the director’s home address to 
corporate headquarters. I computed it based on the zip codes of these two addresses. I then 
classify a director as local if the distance between the director’s home address and corporate 
headquarters is within 50 miles and non-local if the distance is greater than 50 miles. To 
obtain a clearer local variable, I exclude director observations where the distance is between 
50 and 100 miles for the tests of directors’ trades3.  
I identify around 11,300 distinct zip codes in the data. I obtain the latitude and 
longitude for each of the zip codes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip 
Code Database. The corresponding company location comes from Compact Disclosure, 
which contain information about the company headquarters’ zip code. Finally, I compute the 
distances based on the combination of firm headquarters’ zip code and directors zip code4.   
Table 1 presents the distributions of directors by distance from their firms’ 
headquarters. For the employee directors, 18,560 out of 22,879 director-year observations 
are within 50 miles. This is not surprising since most of employee directors are working in 
the corporate headquarters. For the employee directors, only 3,966 out of 22,879 director-
year observations live over 100 miles away, accounting for about 17% of all insider director-
year observations. For the independent directors, there are 33,724 out of 68,751 outside 
director-year observations are within 50 miles radius, accounting for 49% of all observations 
for independent directors. Over 48% or 32,751 of independent director year observations are 
                                                 
3 There are 696 buy trade observations from the directors who live between 50 and 100 miles away from 
headquarters.  
4 A detailed explanation about the method can be found in Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005). 
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over 100 miles away from the corporate headquarters. Looking at the geographic distribution 
by the city or state, there are 3,214 employee directors living in the same city as the 
headquarters and 18,764 living in the same state. This is compared with 3,908 independent 
directors who live in the same city and 36,075 who live in the same state as the corporate 
headquarters. 
In this study, my main variable for geographic proximity is the local variable 
classified by the distance. The drawback of the same-state or same-city variable is that 
headquarter and director home addresses might be located close to state boundaries or city  
boundaries leading to incorrect classification of proximity. Since my focus is on the social 
interaction between independent directors and CEOs, the distance measure would better 
capture the proximity between the CEO and directors. For example, the independent director 
who lives in Miami would not necessary have more social interaction with the CEO in 
Jacksonville than the independent directors living in Savannah, Georgia. 
 
Table 1 Distribution of Director by Distance 
Director Type Distance SameCity SameState Total 
  < 50 miles 50-100 miles > 100 miles       
Employee 18,560 353 3,966 3,214 18,764 22,879 
Independent  33,724 2,456 32,571 3,908 36,075 68,751 
Gray  9,440 506 6,293 1,439 9,872 16,239 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the major variables. Q is defined as 
market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost, as in Chung and Pruitt (1994)5. It 
                                                 
5Alternatively, Q has been proxied by the mmarket-to-book ratio, as the market value of the firm’s equity at 
the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm's assets and the book value of the 
firm's equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm's assets at the end of the year. In 
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is computed as the sum of market value of equity, liquidation value of preferred 
stock(Compustat item 10), net value of debt, which is short term debt liability (Compustat 
item 72 ) net current asset (Compustat item 68), and book value of long term debt 
(Compustat item 9), and then scaled by book value of  total assets. In the sample, firms have 
a mean Q of 1.43 with a standard deviation of 1.84.  
ROA is computed, following Fich and Shivdasani (2006), as operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat item 13) plus the decrease in receivables (Compustat item 2), the 
decrease in inventory (Compustat item 3), the increase in current liabilities (Compustat item 
72), and the decrease in other current assets (Compustat item 68). I then scared it by the 
average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total assets (Compustat item 6).  
Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), I also create a variable for CEO 
involvement to measure the influence of CEO in the selection of directors. It equals to 1 
when the CEO sits on the nominating committee or CEO sits on the board when the firm 
does not have a nominating committee. It has a mean value of 0.3, indicating that in about 
30% of the firm whose director selection procedure is influenced by the CEOs. 
I also use urban and rural variables as documented in Loughran and Schultz (2005). 
A stock is defined as an urban stock if the company headquarters is in one of the ten largest 
metropolitan areas of the United States according to the 2000 census. These include New 
York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington-Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, 
Boston, Detroit, Dallas, and Houston. A company is defined as rural if its headquarters is 
100 miles or more from the center of any of the 49 U.S. metropolitan areas of one million or 
more people according to the 2000 census. The sample has 40% director-year observations 
with headquarter in urban areas, 8% in rural area and the remaining 52% in the suburbs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the tests, using this metric, not reported for the sake of brevity, yield similar results with the ones reported 
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I created two variables to identify the independent director’s geographic 
characteristics based on the distance of their residence from firm headquarters: a) an 
indicator variable for 100% non-local independent directors on the board, and b) the number 
of local independent directors on the board. In the sample, about 16% of the available firm-
year observations have a board with 100% non-local independent directors. The sample 
firms have an average 2.79 local independent directors with a median 2 local independent 
directors on the board. Overall, 50% of independent directors on the board are local. 
In Panels B and C of Table 2, I also separate the sample firms into groups based on 
the geographic characteristics: urban and rural, and based on the board locality 
characterisitics: zero local independent directors’ board and all others. As shown in Panel B, 
urban firms are, on average, larger than rural firms. Urban firms also have more local 
independent directors on the board. On average, urban firms have 2.9 local independent 
directors (55% of the total independent directors) compared with 2.2 for the rural firms (39% 
of the total independent directors).  
In Panels B and C of Table 2, I also separate the sample firms into groups based on 
the geographic characteristics: urban and rural, and based on the board locality 
characterisitics: zero local independent directors’ board and all others. As shown in Panel B, 
urban firms are, on average, larger than rural firms. Urban firms also have more local 
independent directors on the board. On average, urban firms have 2.9 local independent 
directors (55% of the total independent directors) compared with 2.2 for the rural firms (39% 
of the total independent directors).  
When we compare the firms with 100% non-local independent director boards with 
all other firms, we observe that the former group, on average, consists of small firms in terms 
                                                                                                                                                 
here. 
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of assets value. Also, in contrast to firms with local independent directors on the board, those 
firms are more likely to be headquartered in a rural area, rather than in an urban area. For the 
firms with zero local independent directors 28% are in urban and 15% are in rural areas,  
while 42% (7%) of firms with all other types of board structure are in (rural) areas.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A 
Firm characteristics  
  Mean Median SD N 
Sales ($ million) 4527 1218 12491 11416 
Assets ($ million) 11711 1568 55096 11416 
Q 1.43 0.98 1.84 11416 
Return on assets 0.13 0.13 0.12 10483 
Age 27.55 22 18.73 11416 
# of business segments 2.7 2 1.79 10691 
Capital expenditure/assets 0.06 0.04 0.06 10569 
Governance structure and CEO compensation 
  Mean Median SD N 
Board size 8.74 8 2.97 11416 
Number of independent directors 6.17 6 2.72 11416 
CEO ownership (%) 2.54 0.33 6.22 9978 
Director ownership (%) 8.62 1.3 19.51 11416 
CEO compensation ($ million) 11.83 6.59 18.67 10439 
CEO involvement dummy 0.3 0 0.46 11416 
CEO-Chair dummy 0.66 1 0.47 11416 
Board and firm geographic characteristics 
  Mean Median SD N 
Urban dummy 0.4 0 0.49 11416 
Rural dummy 0.08 0 0.27 11416 
100% non-local independent director board 0.16 0 0.36 11416 
# of local independent directors  2.79 2 2.29 11416 
% of independent directors are local 50% 50% 33% 11416 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (continue) 
 
Panel B 
Firm Characteristics 
  Urban Firms Rural Firms    
  Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N 
Difference 
of Mean 
P-
value 
Sales ($ million) 5416.97 1271.65 15316.8 4570 4771.82 979.69 18568.02 930 645.15 0.26 
Assets ($ million) 17993.14 1889.06 76853.02 4570 7234.28 1459.01 15680.82 930 10758.86 0.00 
Q 1.55 1 2.37 4570 1.09 0.88 0.9 930 0.46 0.00 
Return on assets 0.17 0.16 0.18 4082 0.17 0.16 0.17 828 0 0.25 
Age 27.49 21 20.14 4570 28.34 28 16.21 930 -0.85 0.27 
# of business segments 2.8 3 1.84 4284 3.2 3 2.04 848 -0.4 0.00 
Capital expenditure/assets 0.06 0.04 0.06 4224 0.07 0.05 0.07 849 -0.01 0.00 
 Governance structure and CEO compensation 
Board size 8.59 8 2.96 4570 8.97 9 2.96 930 -0.38 0.00 
Number of independent 
directors 6 6 2.56 4570 6.35 6 2.71 930 -0.35 0.00 
CEO ownership (%) 2.48 0.31 5.79 3919 3.42 0.41 8.34 816 -0.94 0.00 
Director ownership (%) 8.56 1.3 18.02 4570 7.62 1.4 14.74 930 0.94 0.13 
CEO compensation ($ 
million) 14824.2 8236.72 21989.99 4159 7290.66 4494.46 8148.3 856 7533.54 0.00 
CEO involvement dummy 0.29 0 0.45 4570 0.32 0 0.47 930 -0.03 0.03 
CEO-Chair dummy 0.67 1 0.47 4570 0.62 1 0.49 930 0.05 0.00 
 Board geographic characteristics  
100% non-local 
independent director board 0.11 0 0.31 4570 0.29 0 0.45 930 -0.18 0.00 
# of local independent 
directors  2.98 3 2.19 4570 2.23 2 2.26 930 0.75 0.00 
% of independent directors 
are local 0.55 0.6 0.32 4570 0.39 0.33 0.36 930 0.16 0.00 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (continue) 
 
Panel C 
Firm Characteristics 
  Board w/ 100% non-Local Directors Board w/ Local Directors    
  Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N 
Difference 
of mean P-value 
Sales ($ million) 4511.17 1040.21 13896.85 1779 4533.15 1259.6 12223.13 9623 -21.98 0.94 
Assets ($ million) 6784.46 1300.03 35458.51 1779 12634.13 1646.31 57995.98 9623 -5849.67 0.00 
Q 1.43 1.01 2.28 1779 1.43 0.97 1.75 9623 0 0.93 
Return on assets 0.17 0.17 0.18 1707 0.17 0.17 0.17 8666 0 0.23 
Age 26.33 19 19.32 1779 27.78 23 18.62 9623 -1.45 0.00 
# of business segments 2.67 2 1.82 1757 2.71 3 1.78 8920 -0.04 0.39 
Capital expenditure/assets 0.07 0.05 0.07 1742 0.06 0.04 0.06 8814 0.01 0.00 
  Governance structure and CEO compensation 
Board size 7.89 8 2.79 1779 8.91 9 2.97 9623 -1.02 0.00 
Number of independent 
directors 5.27 5 2.61 1779 6.34 6 2.7 9623 -1.07 
0.00 
CEO ownership (%) 2.69 0.39 6.46 1491 2.52 0.32 6.18 8473 0.17 0.34 
Director ownership (%) 10.52 1.7 23.67 1779 8.28 1.3 18.63 9623 2.24 0.00 
CEO compensation ($ 
million) 10483.37 6258.78 16344.29 1560 12079.53 6670.28 19051.08 8865 -1596.16 
0.00 
CEO involvement dummy 0.34 0 0.47 1779 0.3 0 0.46 9623 0.04 0.00 
CEO-Chair dummy 0.64 1 0.48 1779 0.67 1 0.47 9623 -0.03 0.00 
 Firm Geographic Characteristics  
Urban dummy 0.28 0 0.45 1779 0.42 0 0.49 9623 -0.14 0.00 
Rural dummy 0.15 0 0.36 1779 0.07 0 0.25 9623 0.08 0.00 
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Empirical Results 
Directors Trades Return: Local vs. Non-local 
In order to test the information advantage of the local directors versus non-local 
directors, I collect all insider buys for all independent directors from Insider Trading 
database6. For each director-purchase trade, I mimic it by going long the firm’s stock and at 
same time short the value-weighted CRSP market index. I compute cumulative market 
adjusted returns and buy and hold market adjust return for each trade. The cumulative market 
adjusted return for the horizon H is computed as the sum of difference of daily stock return 
and daily value-weighted market index return.  
,
1 1
H H
iH it Index H
t t
CAR R R
= =
= −∑ ∑  
The buy and hold market adjusted return (BHAR) for the horizon H is the sum of 
compounded daily stock return minus the compounded daily value weighted CRSP market 
index return.  
1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )iH i i iH Index Index IndexHBHAR R R R R R R= + × + ⋅⋅ + − + × + ⋅⋅ +  
Each director-purchase trade is then classified into local or non-local trades based on 
the geographic location of the directors. Table 3 presents the directors trades cumulative 
return and BHR return before and after adjusted by the value weighted CRSP index for 
periods from 3 months up to 2 years. 
As shown in the Table 3, the cumulative return for the local independent directors’ 
purchase trades ranges between 0.085 for a three months period to 0.44 for two years, 
compared with 0.078 to 0.375 for non-local independent directors trades. The difference 
between their trades stands 0.008 to 0.065, which are statically significant at the 5% level. 
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After adjusting by the CRSP value-weighted market return, the difference of the trades’ 
profit are similar to those of cumulative returns and are still significant, in both economic 
and statistic levels.  
Panel C and D show the buy and hold return for the director trades. For all periods 
from 3 months to 2 years, the return for local independent director purchase trades are higher 
than non-local director trades. The differences between these two are still statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 3 Trading Performance of Directors: Local vs. Non-local 
 
  Panel A: Cumulative return 
  3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 
Local independent 0.085 0.140 0.253 0.440 
Non-local independent 0.078 0.110 0.213 0.375 
Difference(Local-Non-local) 0.008 0.030 0.040 0.065 
P-values (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Panel B: Market adjusted cumulative return 
Local independent 0.053 0.080 0.142 0.268 
Non-local independent 0.045 0.053 0.104 0.193 
Difference(Local-Non-local) 0.007 0.027 0.038 0.074 
P-values (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Panel C: Buy and hold return 
Local independent 0.082 0.137 0.302 0.495 
Non-local independent 0.072 0.104 0.209 0.400 
Difference(Local-Non-local) 0.009 0.034 0.092 0.095 
P-values (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Panel D: Market adjusted buy and hold return  
Local independent 0.049 0.078 0.188 0.305 
Non-local independent 0.041 0.048 0.097 0.198 
Difference(Local-Non-local) 0.009 0.030 0.091 0.107 
P-values (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
In Table 4, I sort the firms in the sample into the size terciles and report CARs and 
BHARs by size terciles. Malloy (2005) shows that the local information advantage is 
stronger in small and highly levered firms. If local directors, as other monitors, also have an 
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information advantage, the advantage would be stronger when the firm has less external 
information which the non-local directors could use. On the other hand, the local information 
advantage can be diminished if the firms are larger or more transparent. To account for this, 
each firm is assigned into small, middle and top size tercile based on the market value at the 
end of previous calendar year.  
As shown in the Table 4, the difference between the returns for local directors’ trades 
and non-local director trades appears to be strongest in the small tercile and gradually 
declines for the medium and large size terciles. For example, the difference for the 6 month 
period is 4.3% between the local director trades and non-local director trades in small size 
tercile, while for the top size tercile, the difference is only 1.99%. Moreover, it becomes 
insignificant for the 1 year and 2 year horizon for the firms in top size tercile. This result 
indicates in small firms local directors have a clearer information advantage while for the 
large firms; the local information advantage becomes weaker as the large firms have more 
external information availability. This finding could be driven by the fact that analysts are 
more likely to follow the large firms, large firms have greater media coverage and more 
voluntary disclosures. This is consistent with Malloy (2005)’s finding.  
 
Table 4 Trading Performance of Directors by Distance  
and Firm’s Information Characteristics 
 Market-Adjusted Return by Size Tercile 
  Small Size Tercile 
 Cumulative Return  Buy and Hold Return 
 6 month 1 year 2 years  6 month 1 year 2 years 
Local Independent 16.65% 28.57% 49.07%  18.21% 41.64% 68.61% 
Non-local independent 12.35% 20.85% 30.30%  13.11% 22.14% 40.96% 
Difference(Local-Non-
local) 4.30% 7.72% 18.77%  5.10% 19.50% 27.65% 
P-values (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 4 Trading Performance of Directors by Distance  
and Firm’s Information Characteristics (continue) 
  Middle Size Tercile 
Local Independent 6.02% 11.63% 23.99%  5.42% 14.76% 21.92% 
Non-local independent 4.02% 8.71% 20.29%  2.97% 7.44% 17.35% 
Difference(Local-Non-
local) 2.00% 2.92% 3.70%  2.45% 7.32% 4.57% 
P-values (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) 
  Top Size Tercile 
Local Independent 3.25% 5.74% 12.48%  2.18% 5.19% 9.71% 
Non-local independent 1.26% 4.18% 10.68%  0.22% 2.36% 6.50% 
Difference(Local-Non-
local) 1.99% 1.56% 1.80%  1.96% 2.83% 3.21% 
P-values (0.00) (0.10) (0.15)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
 
Multivariate Regression Tests: Director Locality and Trades Return 
Though the univariate tests show that there is a significant difference between local 
versus non-local director trades, these tests do not control for other effects that could explain 
the trading differences between local and non-local directors. Table 5 presents the 
multivariate regression tests for the following models: 
, , , ,
, , , , , ,
, , , , , , ,
iH i j t i j t
iH i j t i j t i t i t
iH i j t i j t i t i t i t
BHAR Localdummy DirectorHolding
BHAR Localdummy DirectorHolding Size BM
BHAR Localdummy DirectorHolding Size BM PoorGovernance
ε
ε
ε
= + +
= + + + +
= + + + + +
 
where DirectorHolding i,j,t is the percentage of the shares held by each director j in 
firm i at time t . Localdummyi,j,t equals to 1 if director j’s home address is within 50 miles 
from firm i’s corporate headquarters or 0 otherwise. Size is the market value of the firm at 
the end of the previous calendar year; book to market is defined as the book value at fiscal 
year scaled by the market value of the firm; PoorGovernance is equal to 1 if the G-index is 
greater than 10 and 0 otherwise. As shown in Table V, the dependent variables are the 
compounding abnormal market return at the different horizons. The independent variables 
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are local director indicator (0,1) and director holding. The local director indicator, which is 
the variable of main concern, is statistically significant at the 1% level or better for the six 
months- and one year horizons. The result indicates that on average the local director trades 
yield 0.01 or 1% more than non-local director trades for the three months- and the difference 
goes up to 0.03 for the six months horizon.  
In the second model, I include size and book-to-market as additional controls in the 
main regressions. Size and book-to-market have been documented as main explanatory 
variables for cross-sectional returns. Adding these two variables does not alter the effect of 
the local director indicator. The coefficients for the local director indicators remain pretty 
stable in all three regressions in the second model. Size has a negative coefficient, indicating 
that director trades have a lower return when the size goes up.  
In the third model, I control for the quality of the firm’s governance by adding a poor 
governance dummy. The evidence shows that if firms have poor governance (i.e., a G-Index 
of 10 or more), their directors’ trades yield a higher return. Directors earn 2.6% higher return 
on their trades over a one year horizon if the firm has poor governance. This evidence 
implies that in poor governance firms, insiders are more likely to enjoy an informational 
advantage. 
The results in Table 3 to 5 show that the local directors’ trades yield a higher 
abnormal return than those of the non-local directors. However, this evidence cannot answer 
the question of where this return difference comes from and how other governance 
mechanisms, such as analysts, board meetings and board memberships, could alleviate this 
advantage. In Table 6, I add the following variables to the model: number of analysts 
following the stock at the quarter when the trade made; audit committee member dummy; 
less than 75% board meeting dummy, which equals to one if the director attends over 75% of 
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the board meetings; interaction terms with the local director variables. 
If board attendance or audit committee membership is substitute channels for 
accessing firm’s information, then they could also explain the performance of director trades. 
As shown in all regressions, the significance of local director trades is not affected after 
adding these two controls: an indicator of board attendance which equals to 1 if the director 
attends less than 75% board meetings and a dummy for audit committee membership, and it 
is still significant statistically at 0.000 level.  
Board attendance has a negative coefficient, implying that attending less board 
meeting would reduce the trade profit. Audit membership also has a positive coefficient but 
insignificant for the horizons over six months and one year, indicating being a member of the 
audit committee will result in more profitable trades. 
The inclusion of interaction terms serves the purpose of disentangling the effects of 
the “informative monitor” and “social ally” roles the local directors may play on the board. 
Conditional on analyst following or size, the marginal effect of the local indicator variable 
would be smaller if local directors play an “informative monitor” role. 
However, conditional on the poor governance, I would expect the marginal effect of 
the local director indicator would be greater if local directors assume the role of the CEO’s 
“social ally”. Note that, as shown in Table 5, if the firm has poor governance, both local and 
distant directors would expect to have earn higher returns on their trades, consistent with the 
notion that they both enjoy some information advantage. 
As shown in Table 6, the coefficients for the interaction terms between the local 
director indicator and analyst following and poor governance respectively, are significant 
and negative when performance is measured over a one year horizon. 
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Table 5 Independent directors’ trades return: local vs. non-local 
  Buy and Hold Market Adjusted Return 
 3-month 6-month 1-year 3-month 6-month 1-year 3-month 6-month 1-year 
Local director 
indicator (0,1) 0.011 0.033 0.103 0.011 0.034 0.103 0.011 0.034 0.103 
 (0.013)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.012)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.011)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Director holding -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.301) (0.721) (0.571) (0.447) (0.999) (0.308) (0.519) (0.959) (0.270) 
Size    -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Book to market    0.024 0.046 0.094 0.025 0.047 0.096 
    (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.011)** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.011)** 
Poor governance(G-
index>10)       0.018 0.013 0.026 
       (0.000)*** (0.073)* (0.089)* 
Constant -0.013 0.016 -0.078 -0.026 -0.010 -0.128 -0.030 -0.013 -0.135 
 (0.293) (0.388) (0.004)*** (0.050)* (0.652) (0.000)*** (0.023)** (0.549) (0.000)*** 
Observations 16038 16038 16038 16038 16038 16038 16038 16038 16038 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 
 
  This suggests that the informational advantage of the local directors over the distant directors decreases as analyst 
following increases. This is consistent with the notion that the local directors’ information advantage weakens in the more 
transparent firms. The coefficient of the interaction term between local director indicator and audit committee membership indicator 
is positive, indicating that local directors enjoy and even greater information advantage if they are also sitting on the audit 
committee. 
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The negative coefficient of the interaction term between local director indicator and 
poor governance implies that the local directors’ information advantage relative to distant 
directors becomes smaller when governance is poor.  
 
Table 6 Independent directors’ trades return: local versus non-local 
after controlling for asymmetry information 
  Buy and Hold Market Adjusted Return 
  3-month 6-month 1-year 
Local director 0.004 0.061 0.137 
 (0.700) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003)*** (0.110) (0.000)*** 
Book to market 0.034 0.062 0.130 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Director holding -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.000)*** (0.034)** (0.468) 
Number of analysts -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.038)** (0.003)*** (0.487) 
Less than 75% attendance indicator (0,1) -0.004 -0.033 -0.038 
 (0.771) (0.111) (0.306) 
Committee membership - audit -0.008 0.011 0.005 
 (0.269) (0.303) (0.771) 
Poor governance(G-Index >10) 0.026 0.061 0.086 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Local X Size 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.035)** (0.884) (0.669) 
Local X Analysts -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 
 (0.595) (0.861) (0.013)** 
Local X Audit Membership 0.014 0.010 0.116 
 (0.174) (0.522) (0.000)*** 
Local X Poor governance -0.004 -0.073 -0.083 
 (0.675) (0.000)*** (0.008)*** 
Constant -0.024 -0.021 -0.184 
 (0.100)* (0.371) (0.000)*** 
Observations 13542 13542 13542 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 
Firm Value and Director Locality    
Previous research has documented that firm value is related to the board 
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characteristics. An effective board would likely enhance the firm value. For example, 
Yermack (1996) finds a negative link between board size and firm value, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) shows that busy boards have a negative impact on firm’s Q. Vafeas 
(1999) presents evidence that board meetings become more frequent after bad firm 
performance. However, how the distribution of director affects board effectiveness and 
hence the firm value is not yet resolved. In the previous section, I have shown that local 
independent directors seem to have more information on their firms, as evidenced by their 
more informative trades. According to our efficiency hypothesis, more local independent 
directors sitting on the board would benefit the firm by increasing efficiency and, hence, 
improve the Q as the local directors are more informed and thus better monitors. On the 
other hand, the likelihood of social interaction between board independent directors and 
corporate executives increases with geographic proximity and, thus, creates a weaker board 
when the board is dominated by the local directors.  
To address this issue, I collect data from 1996 to 2004 from IRRC and find the 
distance information for each director in the board. The number of firms per year with non-
missing distance information ranges about 800 to 1100 firms per year. The dependent 
variable Q is defined following Chung and Pruitt (1994). The main explanatory variable is 
director locality. I create two different director locality variables. The first one is the number 
of local independent directors on the board, and the second one is the zero local independent 
directors’ indicator, which takes the value of 1 if there is none of the independent directors 
who are local, and 0 otherwise. To control the board characteristics, I include several main 
variables previously used in the literature. The independent variables include the log form of 
board size (Yermack(1996)), stock ownership of CEOs, directors’ ownership(Morck, 
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Shleifer and Vishny(1988)), busy board dummy, which is equal to 1 if the firm has at least 1 
busy director(Fich and Shivdasai(2006)), log form of number of board meetings 
(Vafeas(1999), firm age, number of different business segments(Lang and Stultz(1994)), 
growth opportunity as proxied by capital expenditure (Smith and Watts(1992)), firm 
leverage and size proxied by the log form of sales.  
Table 7 shows the result for the fixed-effect panel regressions. The year dummies are 
also included but not reported. In the first column of Table 7, the locality variable is the 
number of local independent directors. The coefficient for the number of local independent 
directors is negative and significant. This shows that for each additional local independent 
director on the board, the Q on average decreases by 0.045.  
The board size has a negative and slightly significant coefficient in the first 
regression. This is consistent with Yermack (1996) and indicates a large board would be less 
effective and thus decrease the firms’ value. CEO ownership and director ownership both 
have a positive impact on Q but only CEO ownership has a statically significant effect. This 
result is consistent with the notion that ownership helps align the interests of the CEO and 
stockholders. Busy board has a negative coefficient, in support of the view that the directors 
who are busy would exert less effort. Consistent with Vafeas(1999), the number of board 
meetings is associated with lower Qs, possibly because firms tend to increase the frequency 
of board meetings after they have experienced poor performance.  
In the second column, I create a strong local board dummy to explore the effect of 
non-local independent directors on the board. The base group is that the firm with at least 
one local independent directors. As shown in the table 7, the zero local independent director 
dummy has a significant positive impact on the firm value. Compared with base group, on 
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average, the Q is 0.317 higher for the firm with zero local independent directors or 100% 
non-local independent directors. Given that the standard deviation of Q is 1.84, it indicates 
that firm with no local directors on the board would have about a 17% higher Q than other 
firms. 
The results do not support the notion that the presence of local independent directors 
helps improve board effectiveness, i.e. increase the firm value. Instead the finding in Table 7 
implies that firm value decreases with the presence of more local independent directors on 
the board. 
Q mostly reflects the firm’s market value or the value of growth opportunities. In the 
next section, I discuss how accounting performance measures are affected by the board 
locality. 
 
Table 7 Fixed effect regression of Q on director locality characteristics 
 Q 
# of local independent directors -0.045  
 (0.011)**   
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)   0.317 
   (0.000)*** 
Log(board size) -0.206 -0.246 
 (0.080)* (0.031)** 
CEO ownership 0.021 0.020 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Director ownership 0.002 0.002 
 (0.258) (0.229) 
Busy directors on the board indicator (0,1)    -0.030 -0.034 
 (0.476) (0.429) 
Log(number of board meetings) -0.158 -0.161 
 (0.011)** (0.010)*** 
Age 0.001 0.002 
 (0.946) (0.891) 
Number of different business segments -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.454) (0.430) 
Capital expenditure 2.982 2.962 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
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Table 7 Fixed effect regression of Q on director locality characteristics (continue) 
Leverage -1.474 -1.482 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Log(sales) -0.221 -0.229 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 4.115 4.065 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 8972 8972 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 
 
The corporate governance literature has documented extensively that firm 
performance and board composition are endogenous. It is possible, in the context of this 
study, that firms with weak governance choose a board that is tilted toward greater local 
director representation, which in turn leads to poor performance. To address this issue, we 
conduct a two stage instrumental variables (IV) test to for the endogenous nature of the 
relationship between performance and board geographic structure.   
In the first stage of the regression, we use the number of local independent directors 
or the zero local independent directors’ dummy as the dependent variables. The independent 
variables are: a CEO involvement dummy, which is takes the value of one if the CEO is 
sitting in the nomination committee or if the CEO is chair when the company does not have a 
nomination committee, and the value of zero otherwise; an urban dummy, which takes the 
value of one if the headquarters of the firm are located if the firm’s headquarter is located in 
one of the ten largest metropolitan areas of the United States according to the 2000 census; 
the interaction term between the CEO involvement dummy and the urban dummy; the 
interaction term between the CEO involvement dummy and the natural logarithm of the 
number of independent directors; and, the interaction term between the urban dummy and the 
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natural logarithm of the number of independent directors. The remaining independent 
variables are all control variables used to predict firm value. As shown in the table 8, the 
interaction term between CEO involvement dummy and the natural logarithm of the number 
of independent directors has a coefficient of 0.118, indicating that conditioning on the 
number of independent directors, the board will have on average 0.118 more local directors 
when the CEO is involved in the nomination. In addition, when the firm is located in an 
urban area, the firm has 1.47 more local directors on the board. The same result is obtained 
when the dependent variable used is the zero local independent directors dummy: 
conditioning on the number of independent directors, firms when the CEO is involved in the 
nomination and firm headquarted in the urban area, are less likely to have a board with zero 
local independent board.  
Our second stage regression uses the control variables used in our previous tests of 
firm value together with the predicted board locality variable from the first stage. The results 
we obtain remain qualitatively similar to the ones obtained from the OLS regressions. As 
shown in Table 8, the firm value exhibit a negative association with the boards dominated by 
local directors. An additional local independent director would reduce Tobin’s Q by 0.5. 
Compared with a zero local independent director board, the other boards lead to 4.5 lower in 
terms of Q.  
Table 8 Two Stage IV regression of Q on director locality characteristics 
  Q 
  First Stage 
Second 
Stage 
First 
Stage 
Second 
Stage 
# of local independent directors  -0.583   
  (0.000)***   
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)    4.878 
    (0.000)*** 
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Table 8 Two Stage IV regression of Q on director locality characteristics 
(continue) 
log(board size) 1.553 0.747 -0.108 0.318 
 (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.046)** 
CEO ownership 0.005 0.020 0.000 0.016 
 (0.201) (0.001)*** (0.915) (0.019)** 
Director Ownership -0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.491) (0.424) (0.983) 
Whether the firm has any busy directors -0.036 0.033 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.253) (0.465) (0.911) (0.924) 
Log(Number of board meetings) -0.031 -0.153 0.014 -0.202 
 (0.431) (0.020)** (0.131) (0.007)*** 
Firm Age -0.026 -0.015 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.025) (0.404) (0.998) (0.986) 
Number of different business segments that 
a firm has 0.010 0.031 -0.004 0.030 
 (0.387) (0.083)* (0.142) (0.139) 
Capital Expenditure Adj 0.160 1.940 0.126 1.419 
 (0.638) (0.001)*** (0.102) (0.031)** 
Book Leverage -0.113 -1.567 0.034 -1.713 
 (0.381) (0.000)*** (0.253) (0.000)*** 
Log(sales) -0.127 -0.094 0.032 -0.191 
 (0.001) (0.107) (0.000) (0.003)*** 
CEO involved in nomination indicator (0,1) -0.237  0.096  
 (0.014)  (0.000)  
Urban dummy -2.313  0.141  
 (0.000)  (0.295)  
CEO involvement X Urban 0.021  0.007  
 (0.682)  (0.521)  
Log(# of independent directors) X CEO 
involvement 0.118  -0.065  
 (0.019)  (0.000)  
Log(# of independent directors) X Urban 1.478  -0.083  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant  3.051  2.068 
  (0.000)***  (0.013)** 
Observations  8972  8972 
R-squared     
Number of spc permanent number  1804   1804 
 
Directors Locality and ROA 
Table 9 presents multivariate regressions of ROA on director locality. The dependent 
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variable, ROA, is created following Fich and Shivdasani (2006) as previously described.7 
The other independent variables are those included in the Q regressions. As shown in Table 
VIII, the results of the ROA regressions are consistent with those of the Q regressions. Local 
director presence has a negative impact on the ROA. The coefficient of the number of local 
independent director variable is -0.004, indicating that for an additional local director in the 
board, the firm ROA decreases by 0.004. The impact of locality becomes stronger when I 
compare the board with 100% no local directors and those with at least 1 local director in the 
board, the difference is 0.029. It implies that the board with no local directors on the board 
has a 0.029 higher ROA than other firms. Considering that the standard deviation of ROA is 
about 0.12, the firm with zero local independent directors has a about 0.23 standard deviation 
higher ROA than other counterparts. 
 
Table 9 Fixed effect regression of ROA on director locality characteristics 
 Return on Assets 
# of local independent directors -0.004   
 (0.025)**   
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)   0.029 
   (0.000)*** 
Log(board size) -0.020 -0.024 
 (0.075)* (0.034)** 
CEO ownership 0.003 0.003 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Director ownership -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.409) (0.437) 
Busy directors on the board indicator (0,1)    -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Log(number of board meetings) -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Age -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.471) (0.509) 
                                                 
7 For the sake of brevity, we also have two different definitions of ROA. But the results are basically same. 
So we omitted it to report in the tables. 
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Table 9 Fixed effect regression of ROA on director locality characteristics (continue) 
Number of different business segments -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Capital expenditure 0.509 0.507 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Leverage -0.121 -0.121 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Log(sales) 0.069 0.068 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.167 -0.171 
 (0.009)*** (0.007)*** 
Observations 8740 8740 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 
 
Following the IV technique in the previous section, we ran the same test tor the ROA 
regression, the result remains also qualitatively similar to the fixed effect regression. On 
average, a local independent director is associated with a reduction in ROA by 0.07, while a 
zero local independent board would cause a 0.7 increase in ROA. 
 
Table 10 Two Stage IV regression of ROA on director locality characteristics 
  ROA 
  First Stage 
Second 
Stage First Stage 
Second 
Stage 
# of local independent directors  -0.078   
  (0.000)***   
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)    0.702 
    (0.000)*** 
log(board size) 1.543 0.109 -0.108 0.060 
 (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.001)*** 
CEO ownership 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 (0.143) (0.000)*** (0.834) (0.004)*** 
Director Ownership -0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002)*** (0.310) (0.047)** 
Whether the firm has any busy directors -0.038 -0.008 0.002 -0.014 
 (0.229) (0.094)* (0.743) (0.016)** 
Log(Number of board meetings) -0.029 -0.016 0.010 -0.021 
 (0.463) (0.018)** (0.264) (0.016)** 
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Table 10 Two Stage IV regression of ROA on director locality characteristics (continue) 
Firm Age -0.026 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.026) (0.066)* (0.996) (0.533) 
Number of different bus segments that a firm 
has 0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.491) (0.000)*** (0.092) (0.004)*** 
Capital Expenditure Adj 0.149 0.351 0.156 0.255 
 (0.677) (0.000)*** (0.054) (0.001)*** 
Book Leverage -0.115 -0.133 0.024 -0.148 
 (0.379) (0.000)*** (0.417) (0.000)*** 
Lsales -0.126 0.086 0.032 0.072 
 (0.001) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** 
CEO involved in nomination indicator (0,1) -0.219  0.102  
 (0.025)  (0.000)  
Urban dummy -2.308  0.128  
 (0.000)  (0.344)  
CEO involvement X Urban 0.023  0.006  
 (0.657)  (0.624)  
Log(# of independent directors) X CEO 
involvement 0.107  -0.068  
 (0.036)  (0.000)  
Log(# of independent directors) X Urban 1.474  -0.077  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant  -0.312  -0.461 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Observations  8740  8740 
R-squared     
Number of spc permanent number  1759  1759 
 
Director Locality and CEO Compensation  
The previous sections have shown that the presence of local independent directors is 
negatively related to firm performance. This evidence lends support to the entrenchment 
hypothesis that more social interaction between local independent directors and firm CEO 
leads to a weaker board. To further explore this question, I am testing another crucial 
function the directors play on the board: setting up the CEO compensation. If local directors 
behave in accordance with the entrenchment hypothesis, the presence of local directors 
would more likely result in higher CEO compensation and more importantly a weaker link 
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between CEO compensation and firm performance. Agency theory advocates that strong 
CEO incentive pay is more likely to reduce agency costs. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and 
Yermack (1996) show that strong boards are associated with higher CEO incentive pay. 
Westphal and Zajac(1995) illustrate that the powerful CEO seeks to recruit new directors 
with similar demographic characteristics and, therefore, those directors are more friendly to 
the CEOs when setting up the compensation.  
In Table 11, I assess the relationship between abnormal CEO compensation and local 
directors. The abnormal CEO compensation is defined as the difference between current total 
CEO compensation, sum of salary and bonus, and the median industry CEO total 
compensation. The industry is classified by the first two digits of the firm’s SIC code. As 
control variables, I include size (log of sales), CEO-Chairman dummy, profitability (industry 
adjusted ROA), and growth opportunities (depreciation over sales). 
 
( )it it it it it it itCEOCompensation Local Log sales CEOChairdummy ROA Depreciation ε= + + + + +   
Table 11 has two columns, each corresponding to a different director locality 
variable. As shown in the first column in Table 11, the number of local independent director 
has a significant coefficient of 0.024, implying that for an additional local directors sitting on 
the board, the abnormal CEO compensation increases by 0.024 million dollars. In the second 
column, the coefficient for the zero local director dummy has an opposite sign and with a 
coefficient of -0.04, implying 100% non-local directors would compensate CEO less than the 
median CEO receives in the same industry. Overall, the result shows that local director 
presence would increase the CEO total compensation.  
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Table 11 Regressing CEO total compensation on director locality characteristics 
 
 Industry-adjusted CEO compensation 
# of local independent directors 0.024   
 (0.014)**   
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)   -0.040 
   (0.411) 
Log(sales) 0.429 0.440 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Depreciation/Sales 0.067 0.068 
 (0.022)** (0.021)** 
Chair-CEO indicator(0,1) 0.091 0.091 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Return on assets 1.079 1.052 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -3.023 -3.025 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 9917 9917 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 
 
In addition, the board of directors not only set up the level of CEO compensation, but 
more importantly, they also set up the link between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. Previous research has documented that the link is stronger when firms have 
more effective boards (for instance, Yermack(1997)). In Table 12, I create the CEO 
incentive variable in the spirit of Core and Guay (1999), measured by the dollar change in 
the value of stock and option CEO holds from a one percentage change of firm’s stock price. 
Following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), I create the CEO incentive ratio as follows:  
0.01 ( )it it it itOnepct Price Shares Options= × × +  
/( )it it it it itCEOIncentive Onepct Onepct Salary Bonus= + +  
Where shares is the number of shares the CEO holds, options is the sum of the stock 
options the CEO granted, number of unexercised options and number of exercisable options. 
Each regression includes the same control variables as in Table X, with the addition of the 
log of board size. I then regress the CEO incentive pay on the director locality variables and 
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the other controls. According to agency theory, an effective board acting in the best interest 
of stockholders would create a strong link between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. As shown in the column and second column, the director locality variable has a 
negative sign, which implies that adding the local directors on the board would weaken the 
link between CEO incentive pay and firm performance. For example, for additional local 
directors on the board, the CEO incentive pay decreases by 0.003. The second column 
further shows that those firms with no local directors have an increased CEO incentive pay, 
with a positive coefficient of 0.037 which is significant at the 5 percent level.  
In conclusion, Tables 11 and Table 12 indicate that firms with more local directors on 
their boards are more likely to pay their CEOs higher levels of total compensation, thus 
providing a weaker link between CEO pay and firm performance. Overall, these findings are 
consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. The potential social interactions between local 
directors and CEOs make local directors less likely to play the role of watchdog on the 
board. They are more likely to return favors back to CEOs by helping them to set up higher 
compensation and weaken the link between incentive pay and performance.  
 
Table 12 Regressing CEO incentives on directors’ characteristics 
 CEO Incentive 
# of Local Independent Directors -0.003  
  (0.001)**  
Zero local independent directors indicator (0,1)  0.037 
   (0.00)* 
Log(sales) 0.057 0.058 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Depreciation/Sales 0.002 0.003 
 (0.453) (0.400) 
Chair-CEO indicator(0,1) 0.038 0.037 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
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Table 12 Regressing CEO incentives on directors’ characteristics (continue) 
 
Return on assets 0.056 0.049 
  (0.005)*** (0.014)** 
Log(number of board meetings) -0.079 -0.079 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Log(board size) -0.109 -0.11 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.282 0.265 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 9933 9933 
Adjusted R-Square 0.29 0.29 
 
Robustness Tests 
In this study, I investigate the effect of proximate directors on board effectiveness. I 
rely on the measure of distance between the home address and corporate headquarters to 
determine whether the directors are local or distant. I decide the directors are local when they 
are live within a 50 miles radius from the headquarters. This measure is reasonable given 
that the actual travel time could be with in 1 hours drive. However, for the robustness check, 
I excluded the observations for the directors who are living between 50 and 100 miles as 
their information role can be ambivalent. The results, of the trades’ return test do not change. 
Additionally, I also repeated the tests using a different measure, “SameState”, instead of the 
local director indicator. The SameState variable takes the value of one if the directors live in 
the same state as the corporate headquarter. Using SameState rather than distance measure, 
yields qualitatively similar results. This can be partly attributed to the fact that most directors 
in the same state as the headquarters are more likely to be classified as local as well in the 
sample. These results are not reported here for the sake of brevity.  
In addition to using a variety of local director measures, I have also used an 
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alternative measure for Q. Q is a proxy of firm value widely used in the literature. Besides 
the Chung and Pruitt (1994) version of Q, I also used the market-to-book measure, defined as 
sum of market value of equity, book value of assets, minus common equity and then divided 
by the book value of assets. Tests based on market-to-book yield qualitatively similar results 
with the ones reported in the paper.  
 
 
Conclusion 
While many studies have examined geographic characteristics in the context of 
monitoring commercial banks, venture capitalists and security analysts, to our knowledge, 
this is the first study to investigate the role of geographic characteristics in the context of 
board effectiveness.   
I extend the literature of geographic proximity and information advantage by 
examining the difference in performance between trades of local independent directors and 
distant directors. The empirical tests’ results support the notion that the local advantage 
previously recorded in the context of analysts, mutual fund investors, and individual 
investors also appears to exist in the context of the board of directors. On average, local 
director trades significantly outperform those by distant directors. Moreover, the local 
directors’ advantage becomes stronger in smaller firms and firms followed by fewer analysts.  
I further analyze the effect of director locality on board effectiveness. The efficiency 
hypothesis predicts that the presence of local directors would enhance board effectiveness 
and hence improve the firm’s Q and ROA. On the other hand, the entrenchment hypothesis 
posits that more social interaction between local directors and CEO would make local 
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directors weak monitors. Thus, more local directors would weaken the board and lower Q 
and ROA. The presence of local directors significantly reduces both Q and ROA. Our 
empirical tests support the notion that the local directors play a weak role on the board. 
Finally, I test how directors’ locality affects the CEO compensation level and 
incentive pay. Agency theory suggests that higher incentive pay would help align the interest 
of CEO and stockholders. An effective board would be associated with a strong link between 
CEO pay and their performance, i.e., a higher proportion of incentive pay. The results show 
when there are more local directors on the board, firms are inclined to pay a higher level of 
compensation and lower proportion of incentive pay.  
Overall, my results show strong relations between director locality and firm 
performance and CEO compensation, suggesting that director geographic characteristics play 
an important role in the effectiveness of corporate boards. These findings are of special 
interest to both law makers as well as researchers by highlighting the effect of the geographic 
characteristics of corporate boards on board effectiveness and firm performance. 
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Essay 2 ⎯ Director Incentives and Earnings Management 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A well-functioning corporate board is generally considered an important disciplinary 
mechanism that monitors managers and helps align the scope of their decision making with 
the interests of stockholders. Therefore, monitoring by the board of directors has an 
important effect on the economic performance of organizations (Jensen (1989)). However, 
how to motivate board directors to monitor instead of forming alliances with the managers 
has been the subject of ongoing debate. Previous research has focused on the importance of 
directors’ reputation concerns8. In this study, my primary focus is on directors’ incentive 
compensation. According to Compustat ExecuComp Database, there were 274 firms that 
paid directors with stock options in 1992, while the figure climbs to 1,214 in 2002 but then 
drops again to 1,055 in 2004. During the same period, about 660 firms never paid directors 
with stock options and another 102 firms stopped awarding stock options to their directors. 
These changes in director compensation structure pose an interesting empirical question. 
Does the incentive pay matter in terms of motivating directors to monitor managers? If yes, 
how do changes in the form of compensation affect directors’ behavior?  Earlier research on  
the impact of equity-based incentive compensation, such as stocks and stock option, on 
managerial behavior remains inconclusive. Jensen and Meckling(1976) suggested that firms 
suffering from the agency problem resulting from the separation of management and control 
can use incentive compensation to help align the interests of the CEO and stockholders. 
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Several subsequent empirical studies have provided support for this notion. For example, 
Morck, Shelifer and Vishny (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive 
relation between Tobin’s Q and inside director shareholdings.  Warfield et al. (1995) show a 
negative link between managerial stockholdings and the absolute value of abnormal accruals. 
They interpret their results as being consistent with managerial shareholdings acting as a 
disciplinary mechanism. However, incentive compensation may also induce executives to 
become short-term oriented, causing more severe agency problems. For example, Burns and 
Kedia (2006) find that the firms are more likely to misreport accounting information if the 
sensitivity between CEO’s compensation and stock prices is high. Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) show that when the CEO’s incentive pay ranks near the top decile, the 
CEO is likely to sell more shares and exercise more stock options in the current year. In the 
same vein, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Yermack (1997) show that CEOs manage 
investors’ earnings expectations downward prior to scheduled stock option awards in order 
to increase the future value of their awards. Taken together, the empirical evidence suggests 
that if the CEO manages earnings to increase his overall compensation, then there will be a 
positive relation between CEO incentive and earnings management.  
While a large body of research on executive equity incentives exists, there is less 
research on the effect of the form of compensation on directors’ behavior. Unlike CEO’s, the 
directors’ compensation contract that govern their continued participation in board activities 
are relatively less important than their other sources of income. In addition, directors’ 
investment portfolios are more diversified than that of CEOs since director compensation is 
rarely the only source of income. Nevertheless, directors’ compensation is sizeable 
(Yermack(2004)), especially for directors that sit on multiple corporate boards (Fich and 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 For example, Fama(1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Ofek and Yermack(2000). 
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Shivdasani (2006) and Ferris and Jagannathan et al. (2003)).  This suggests that as is the case 
with managers, the director’s compensation structure might also provide a mechanism that 
fosters an alignment of interests with shareholders.  
In this study I empirically address how elements of director compensation structure 
affect directors’ monitoring behavior. Specifically, I test whether directors’ incentive pay 
affects the level of firms’ earning management. If incentive pay induces directors to act as 
monitors, then earnings management is likely to be negatively related to the directors’ 
incentive pay. This study is in the strand of research of Fich and Shivdasani(2005) and Byard 
and Li(2005). Fich and Shivdasani(2005) show that firms that offer stock options to their 
directors’ exhibit higher market to book ratios. Moreover, outside directors’ appointments 
produce near zero abnormal returns for firms with option plans but significantly negative 
abnormal returns for firms without them. Fich and Shivdasani (2005) indicate that stock-
option plans help to align the interests of outside directors and shareholders. However, Byard 
and Li(2005) argue that when stock options are used as a common component of the 
compensation to the CEOs and directors, they can compromise directors’ independence and 
ability to monitor CEO’s option timing opportunities. Consequently, one can argue that 
awarding stock options to directors may reduce their incentives to monitor and therefore 
allow CEOs to manipulate earnings.  
Prior studies have found that board characteristics are associated with the level of 
firms’ earnings management. For example, Klein (2002), among others, shows a negative 
relation between the independence of the auditing committee of the board and abnormal 
accruals. However, her study does not account for the potential conflict arising from stock 
option grants to board directors and how it affects the relationship between directors’ 
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compensation and earnings management. 
In this paper, I empirically investigate whether directors’ incentive pay affects the 
firm’s earnings management using a sample of S&P 500, S&P middle cap 400 and S&P 
small cap 600 firms. Following previous researchers (i.e. Jones (1991), Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998)), I estimate the abnormal discretionary accruals from a group of cross sectional 
regressions estimated by year and industry. I find that earnings management is more severe 
among firms paying their directors with a higher proportion of stock options. This result still 
holds when I control for firm fixed effects. I further examine how board characteristics and 
CEO incentives pay jointly determine earnings management. Conditioning on director 
incentives the firm paid, I show earnings management is significantly larger for firms with 
high level of CEO incentive pay than for firms with low CEO incentive pay, but only when 
directors’ incentive compensation is high as well.   
In the tests, I also control for self-selection bias. Specifically, it is possible that firms 
that have never paid stock options to their directors during the entire sample period could 
also be more likely to have a specific governance mechanism in place that would affect the 
level of firm’s earnings management. After controlling for self selection bias, I find firms 
that awarded their board with stock options engage in more severe earnings management 
than those that never paid their directors with stock options. Moreover, after controlling for 
bias, the degree of earnings management is still positively related to the proportion of 
incentive pay the directors received.  
These results suggest that the interests of directors who receive higher levels of 
incentive pay tend be closely aligned with those of the CEO rather than the shareholders. I 
also examine directors’ option sales for the years following severe earnings management. 
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The findings show large and significant options sales by directors following the years when 
the firm’s earnings management is in the top tercile of the sample firms. This is additional 
evidence in line with the notion that directors may join the CEO in an effort to manipulate 
the earnings so that they could maximize their benefit from exercising their options for the 
purpose of profiting or diversification.  
This paper sheds new light on the relationship between director incentive 
compensation and earnings management. Specifically the results show a positive relationship 
between director incentive pay and earnings management, suggesting that incentive pay may 
compromise the board’s independence. Second, it provides an interpretation for the recent 
years’ phenomenon wherein firms decide to pay less incentive pay to the board of directors.9  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents related literature and hypotheses. 
Section 2 describes data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the results. 
Section 4 presents robustness tests and Section 5 concludes.  
 
Literature Review   
Earnings Management 
Healey and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as a process where 
“managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.” Many researchers have shown evidence that earnings management is 
used to make firm’s financial statement look more optimistic. For example, Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1989) show that firms are more likely to increase accruals before they go public or 
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issue seasoned equity offerings.   
It is argued that the management’s use of earnings management has both costs and 
benefits. Benefits include potential improvements in managements’ credible communication 
of private information to external stockholders (Healey and Wahlen (1999)). A similar 
statement was also appeared in the financial press, “the CEOs know that investors hate 
surprises, so they try to keep net income trending up a nice straight slop…” (Fortune 1989, 
196).  Goel and Thakor (2003) propose that uninformed liquidity investors are more likely to 
hold stocks with less volatile earnings as the informed investors make profits from their 
inside information when the earnings are more volatile. In this context, smoothing earnings 
by borrowing earnings from the next year when current earnings are actually low, or lending 
earnings when the previous year earnings are exceptionally high may provide a manipulative 
way to convince investors to hold on to the stock.  This practice could also be beneficial to 
the firm because it reduces the variance of the firms’ observed earnings and thus reduces the 
cost of borrowing (Trueman and Titman (1999)).  However, this argument relies on 
unrealistic economic and behavior assumptions. Watts (1982) argues that the investors are 
sophisticated enough to be able to undo such manipulations. Thus, the usefulness of CEOs’ 
manipulation of earnings for the sake of reducing earnings variance is suspect.  
Recent empirical research has also highlighted the costs of earnings management. 
Beneish and Vargus (2002) find that abnormally high accruals are associated with increases 
in insider sales of shares but after the “event period”, stock returns tend to be poor. Recent 
work focusing on how CEO compensation is related to earnings management shows that 
CEOs are more likely to use earnings management to inflate stocks prices and thus affect 
their own wealth. For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon 
                                                                                                                                                 
9  See Wall Street Journal Feb 24, 2003. pg. R.4 for a special report on Corporate Governance 
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(2006) provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported 
earnings is more pronounced among firms where the CEO’s potential total compensation is 
more closely tied to the value of the stock and option holdings. Francis, Nanda and Olsson 
(2007) use discretional accruals as a proxy for earnings quality and show that higher 
abnormal discretional accruals are positively related to the firm’s cost of capital, and that 
cost of capital has no effect on the voluntary disclosure in the presence of earnings 
management measures. Their evidence further shows that higher accruals are more likely to 
be associated with insider sales of shares or options. 
 
Director Incentives 
Previous research documented that career and reputation concerns are constitute an 
important disciplinary mechanism that induces directors to act in the best interest of the 
shareholders. For example, Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that labor market pressure and 
concerns for reputation will lead directors to fulfill their duty. Consistent with this argument, 
a handful of studies show that vigilant directors that establish reputations as good monitors 
are expected to be rewarded with additional board seats in the labor market, while lax 
monitors are expected to be penalized with a reduction in board seats. For example, outside 
directors hold fewer board seats after serving in dividend-reducing firms (Kaplan and 
Reishus (1990), in companies that experience financial distress (Gilson (1990)), and in firms 
that perform poorly (Yermack(2004)). In contrast, CEOs from firms that have performed 
well receive outside directorships after retirement (Brickley, Coles, and Linck (1999)).  
Using a sample of 111 public firms that either filed for bankruptcy or privately 
restructured their debt between 1979 and 1985, Gilson (1990) finds that, on average, only 
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46% of incumbent directors remained on the board at the end of bankruptcy or debt 
restructuring period. Directors who resign hold significantly fewer seats on other boards 
following their departure.  
Harford (2003) reports that all directors, and outside directors in particular, are 
unlikely to be retained following a completed takeover offer. All target directors hold fewer 
directorships in the future than a control group, suggesting that the target board seat is 
difficult to replace. If we view takeover as a disciplinary action, his findings support the 
notion that ineffective directors are rewarded with fewer directorship. However, this also 
implies that the incumbent directors including outside directors have an incentive to resist a 
takeover offer in order to keep their hard-to-replace director seats.    
Yermack (2004) finds a positive relation between the company’s performance in the 
previous two years and the net acquisition of new board seats by outside directors over the 
four years after their appointments. Additionally, if a shorter time period is used, such 
relation disappears, suggesting that the market for directors takes time to assess and 
assimilate the monitoring ability of newly appointed directors. 
Another strand of research posits that director compensation is an important tool for 
motivating directors. The typical compensation contract of a director who typically works an 
average of 150 hours a year and sometimes sits on multiple boards include an annual 
retainer, board meeting fees, and restricted stock and option awards. The rationale behind the 
recent trend of including stock award as part of director pay resembles the one for granting 
stock options to a CEO: giving an ownership stake to the agent helps align his/her interests 
with those of the owners. There is some evidence that directors who own more equity are 
better monitors. Perry (1999) finds that when directors of independent boards receive 
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incentive compensation, the likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance 
increases. He also shows that the likelihood of a firm adopting a stock-based incentive plan 
for directors is positively related to the fraction of independent directors on the board.  
In spite of the benefits of improved monitoring, director incentive compensation 
could be a double edge sword, especially in light of the recent dramatic increase of the 
director incentive compensations. The existing research shows that stock based 
compensation can cause managers to manipulate information in order to increase their 
compensation by transferring wealth from the stockholders to the managers. Byard and Li 
(2005) show that when directors receive a lower portion of compensation from stock options, 
the CEOs are less likely to set up the option grant date before (after) the good news (bad 
news) and vise versa.. Incentive pay leads to directors’ interest being more closely tied to the 
interests of the executives and reduces their incentives to monitor.  
 
 
Data and Variables 
Sample description 
The primary sample is retrieved from IRRC. The sample period is from 1996 to 2004. 
The information reported in the IRRC is then combined with data in Compustat and 
Compustat ExecuComp. I exclude all financial firms with SIC 6000-6999 and require that 
firms granted directors stock options in at least one year during the entire sample period. The 
resulting final sample contains 6837 firm-year observations.  
 
Measures of director incentive 
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The director incentive measure is defined as the proportion of incentive pay over the 
director’s total compensation during the given year. IRRC reports the directors committee 
membership, director classification, shares owned, pension and annual compensation. 
Directors receive compensation in the form of cash, stock and options. Since most company 
disclosures for directors’ equity pay are less detailed when compared with those for 
executives, the basic terms of these awards such as the date, the stock price when awarded, 
vesting, or restrictions on sale are often unavailable for directors. I therefore follow Yermack 
(2006) and make a range of assumptions for valuing equity compensation and its incentive 
features. I assume all stock options are awarded at-the-money with 10 year lives. I first value 
options using the Black–Scholes method. Volatility and dividend yields for each firm-year 
are obtained for the vast majority of observations from the ExecuComp database. Then I 
compute total compensation by summing up the option value, annual retainer, board meeting 
fee and value of restricted stock. The director incentive variable is finally obtained by 
dividing the option value from the total compensation of the director.  
 
Measures of earnings management 
I use data from firms’ reported income statements to compute accrual measures. My 
method closely follows that of Dechow et al. (1995), which estimates discretionary accruals 
from regressions of total accruals on changes in sales and on property, plant, and equipment 
(PPE) within industries. 
I obtained accounting information from the Compustat Annual Industrial, 
Research and Full Coverage files. All firm-year observations should satisfy the following 
criteria: (1) domestic firms; (2) firms with non missing values for sales, total assets, net 
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income before extraordinary items, and cash from operations; (4) non-financial firms. 
Ultimately, I am able to estimate discretionary accruals for 57,903 firm-year observations 
over the period from 1996 and 2004.  
To determine discretionary accruals, I first run the following cross-sectional OLS 
regression for each combination of calendar year and two-digit SIC code with a minimum of 
8 observations to estimate coefficients b0, b1, and b2.  
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where j indexes firms, t indexes time, Total accruals(TAC) equals Net Income (Compustat 
item #172) minus Cash Flow from Operations (#308). ΔSales is the changes in sales revenues 
(#12), PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment (#7). All variables used here are scaled by 
total assets(TA) at the beginning of the period (#6) to reduce heteroskedasiticity. I estimate the 
earning using cross-sectional models. I then use the estimated coefficients to calculate 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDTAC) as follows:  
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where, AR is the dollar value of Accounting Receivable (#2) 
Thus, I can derive discretionary accruals (DTAC) as:  
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Since earnings manipulation involves both positive and negative discretional accruals, I use 
the absolute value of discretional accruals to measure the level of earnings management of 
the firm. To reduce possible problems from outliers, I also winsorize the absolute 
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discretional accrual variable at the 1% level. 10 As all the variables are scaled by total assets 
at the beginning of the period, the magnitude of a firm’s discretionary accruals is indicated 
as a percentage of the firm’s assets. 
 
Measures of option sale 
I also collect the data on board directors’ option sales from Thomas Financial Insider 
Trading database. I gather option sales by directors in each calendar year and scaled it by the 
firm’s shares of outstanding. 
 
Other control variables 
Other control variables I retrieve to explain the firm’s earnings management behavior 
are profitability, size, market to book, financial leverage, institutional ownership and current 
growth.  
Profitability is proxied by ROA, which is obtained as the net income scaled by the 
total assets at the beginning of fiscal year. Firms that are more profitable have less incentive 
to adjust the earnings upward to cover a financial problem and thus suggest a negative 
relationship between ROA and abnormal accruals.  
Large firms are followed by more external capital markets and receive more analyst 
coverage while small firms are less like to receive scrutiny about their accounting statement. 
This indicates a negative relationship between earnings management and size (Dechow et 
al.(1995)).  
Institutional investors serve as the external monitors. The firms with large 
institutional ownership would be less likely to hide their earnings with abnormal accruals 
                                                 
10 The results are consistent even when we do not winsorize the accrual measures. 
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(Chung et al. (2002)). Similar to institutional investors, the control of the book leverage, 
proxied by the total long term debt over the total assets, implies a negative relationship as 
firms will receive closer scrutiny from lenders when the debt level is high. But on the other 
hand, firms will have more incentive to adjust earnings because they do not want to lead to a 
debt-covenant violation when the performance is poor and thus miss earnings target set by 
the lenders (DeFond and Park (1997)). 
Previous studies also argue that earnings management is an interaction between the 
current stockholders and future stockholders (Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005)). 
Although its effect on the earnings management is not clear, I control it with the current asset 
growth, which is defined as change of total assets scaled by the total assets at the beginning 
of fiscal year 
Firms with higher growth rate are more likely to overinvest in current assets in 
anticipation of future growth of sales. This practice leads to a positive relationship between 
earnings management and growth rate.  The growth rate is proixed by the market to book 
ratio. 
  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 13 provides descriptive statistics for the director compensation, director 
incentive and earnings management measures. Panel A presents details of the director 
compensation variable. Across 6,839 firm-year observations, the mean annual retainer is 
$22,260, with a standard deviation of $14,700. The Annual meeting fee, the product of 
number of board meetings and meeting fee, has a mean value of $7,740 with a standard 
deviation of $7,380. On average, restricted stock, while reflects the value of the restricted 
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stock newly issued when the board meeting holds, is $2,840 per year. The option awards 
accounts for the largest part of the director compensation. Based on the Black-Scholes 
formula, the option value stands at $103,160 for an average director in the sample. The 
variation of the option pay is substantial, as indicated by a standard deviation of $262,180.  
To further assess how the average level of director incentive and earnings 
management varies over time and with one another, I also provide their mean values for each 
year from 1996 to 2004 in Panel B and C, respectively. As shown in Panel B, the option 
portion of the payment in director compensation climbs each year from 1996 until it peaked 
in 2002 and then started to decline.  
Panel C shows the yearly distribution of the mean absolute discretionary accrual. In 
2000 and 2004, the evidence indicates a severe earnings management problem on average 
with absolute discretional accruals of 0.21 and 0.28 respectively. However, the median 
shows a more consistent pattern of earnings management over time, thus suggesting that the 
mean values could be reflective of extreme outliers. 
 
Table 13 Descriptive statistics of earnings management 
and incentive  measure by years 
Panel A: Board director Compensation (in $ thousand) 
 Sample size Mean Median Standard deviation 
Annual Retainer 6837 22.26 20 14.7 
Annual Meeting Fee 6837 7.74 7 7.38 
Restricted Stock  5605 2.84 0 8.45 
Option 6694 103.16 41.08 262.18 
  55  
 
Table 13 Descriptive statistics of earnings management 
and incentive  measure by years(continue) 
 
Panel B: Director Incentive 
1996 544 0.39 0.37 0.33 
1997 670 0.47 0.52 0.33 
1998 694 0.49 0.55 0.33 
1999 700 0.51 0.57 0.32 
2000 756 0.53 0.58 0.34 
2001 806 0.56 0.62 0.33 
2002 865 0.59 0.67 0.31 
2003 862 0.55 0.61 0.3 
2004 797 0.53 0.61 0.33 
Total 6694 0.52 0.58 0.33 
Panel C: Absolute Discretional Accrual 
1996 544 0.06 0.04 0.06 
1997 677 0.07 0.04 0.09 
1998 730 0.07 0.04 0.10 
1999 729 0.09 0.04 0.17 
2000 785 0.20 0.05 0.38 
2001 848 0.08 0.05 0.12 
2002 865 0.08 0.04 0.12 
2003 862 0.08 0.04 0.26 
2004 797 0.23 0.04 0.59 
Total 6837 0.11 0.04 0.28 
 
Table 14 provides summary statistics on main variables and a first look at whether 
measures of director incentive and earnings management are correlated. Averaging across all 
firm-year observations, the mean (median) absolute discretionary accrual is 0.12 (.04) and 
the sample standard deviation is 0.39. The mean (median) director incentive is 52% (58%) of 
the director’s total compensation, with a standard deviation of 0.33. The correlation between 
director incentive and absolute discretionary accruals is 0.08, significantly at the 1% level, 
which suggests that a higher portion of incentive pay in the director compensation is related 
with a more severe earnings management problem. The absolute discretionary accruals are 
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also negatively correlated with ROA, which indicates that profitable firms have less severe 
earnings manipulation problems.  The director incentive measure is negatively correlated 
with the book to market ratio. 
 
Table 14 Summary statistics and correlations of earnings management 
and incentive measures 
Panel A 
  Sample size Mean Median Standard deviation 
Absolute discretionary accrual 6837 0.12 0.04 0.39 
     
Director incentive 6694 0.52 0.58 0.33 
     
ROA 6836 0.03 0.05 0.18 
     
Book to market 6830 0.53 0.43 0.52 
     
Total asset(in million dollars) 6837 4690.38 1149.74 15747.08 
     
Asset growth 6836 0.14 0.07 0.38 
     
Institutional ownership 6837 0.62 0.63 0.17 
Panel B 
 Correlation(p-value) 
  Director incentive ROA 
Book to 
market 
Total 
asset 
Asset 
growth 
Institutional 
ownership 
Absolute discretionary accrual 0.08 -0.18 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.12) (0.00) (0.55) 
Director incentive 1.00 -0.02 -0.16 -0.12 0.10 0.17 
  (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA  1.00 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.12 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Book to market   1.00 -0.04 -0.13 -0.09 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total asset(in million dollars)    1.00 0.06 0.08 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
Asset growth     1.00 0.09 
      (0.00) 
Institutional ownership           1.00 
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Empirical Results 
Univariate Analysis 
In Table 15, I test for differences in earnings management across groups of firms formed after sorting on different variables 
of interest. More specifically, I sort by director incentives, ROA, market to book ratio, log(market value), institutional ownership, 
and book leverage, and test for differences of mean values of earnings management across the highest tercile and lowest tercile 
groups. For example, after sorting firms in the top and bottom tercile of director incentive, the mean earnings management is shown 
separately for the sub-samples of high-director incentive firms and low-director incentive firms. 
 
Table 15 Univariate analysis 
  Director incentive ROA Market to book 
Log(market 
value) Asset growth 
Institutional 
ownership Book leverage 
High Group 0.144 0.107 0.139 0.111 0.121 0.102 0.098 
Low Group 0.083 0.133 0.079 0.121 0.117 0.125 0.135 
Difference 0.061 -0.026 0.060 -0.009 0.005 -0.024 -0.037 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.289) (0.558) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Not surprisingly, firms with high market to book ratio have significantly higher 
earnings management than firms with low market to book ratio (0.139 versus 0.079). This 
difference is also statistically significant (p-value=0.000).  Earnings management is also 
larger for high director incentive than for low director incentive stocks, and the difference is 
also statistically significant at 1% level. This finding provides preliminary evidence that 
stock option pay for directors may provide encouragement, or at least tolerance, for earnings 
management.  Earnings management is much higher for low than for high institutional 
ownership firms (0.125 versus 0.102), consistent with the view that institutional investors act 
as external monitors, thereby reducing earnings management. Overall, the evidence from 
table 3 is consistent with that of the correlation evidence found in Table 2. However, this 
univariate analysis is still not sufficient enough to draw definitive conclusions as it does not 
control for many other variables simultaneously. Thus, the next section proceeds with a 
series of multivariate tests to further examine the relationship between directive incentive 
pay and earnings management. 
 
Regressing earnings management on director incentives  
Table 16 provides multivariate regression analysis of the effect of director option 
compensation on earnings management. I control for ROA market-to-book, size (log of 
market value), asset growth, institutional ownership, book leverage, year dummies (not 
reported), and Fama-French 48 industry dummies (not reported). The White’s (1980) method 
is used to control for heteroskedasticity, and all p-values are reported with robust standard 
errors. The regression is clustered at the individual firm level to reduce the serial correlation 
across each firm over different years.  
The first column contains the OLS regression and the second column the fixed effects 
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regression results. The findings are consistent with the univariate evidence in Tables 2 and 3. 
Specifically, the coefficient for director incentive is 0.023, and statistically significant with a 
p-value of 0.017. This result shows that when director incentives increase by 1, earnings 
management will increase by 0.023. Or put another way, if the percentage of option 
compensation to total compensation increases from 50% to 80%, which is about 1 standard 
deviation change of director incentive, the earnings management will increase by 0.69%.  
Given that the absolute discretionary accrual is scaled by total assets at the beginning of each 
year, 0.69% represents a $3.236 million increase in discretionary accruals on average.  In 
line with the univariate analysis, ROA, institutional ownership and leverage have significant 
negative effects on the firm’s earnings management, while market to book and asset growth 
have a positive impact on earnings management. Overall, the result suggests that the firms 
are more likely to manipulate their earnings when the directors are paid with higher incentive 
compensation. 
Table 16 Director incentives and earnings management 
  Dependent variable: absolute discretionary accrual 
  OLS Fixed Effect 
Director incentive 0.023 0.080 
 (0.017)** (0.000)*** 
ROA -0.216 -0.283 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Market to book 0.005 0.006 
 (0.035)** (0.006)*** 
Log(market value) -0.001 -0.014 
 (0.715) (0.091)* 
Asset growth 0.070 0.096 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Institutional ownership -0.043 0.014 
 (0.043)** (0.775) 
Book leverage -0.034 -0.066 
 (0.066)* (0.020)** 
Observations 6665 6665 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.08 
Number of standard and poor's identifier   1281 
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Board characteristics and earnings management 
Klein (2005) and Xie et al. (2003) show that a more independent board may lead to 
lower earnings management and that an independent auditing committee may also reduce 
earnings manipulations. Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008) further show that an effective 
governance structure, such as more independent board, will decrease the earnings 
management. Thus, the analysis in Table 17 controls for different board characteristics. In 
particular, the following variables are added: a board independence indicator that is equal to 
1 if over 51% of board members are independent; the percent of independent directors on the 
auditing committee; an auditing committee independence indicator variable; and an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the auditing committee is 100% independent.  In all four regressions 
shown in Table 5, director incentive pay shows a significant positive relationship with 
earnings management. The coefficients for director incentives range from 0.023 to 0.027 and 
are statistically significant at the 5% level. The board characteristics variables are not 
statistically significant. Thus, these findings provide further evidence that stock option pay 
for directors is associated with higher earnings management, even after controlling for other 
important board characteristics. 
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Table 17 Director incentives and earnings management: controlling for board characteristics 
  Dependent variables: Absolute discretional accrual 
Director incentive 0.023 0.027 0.028 0.027 
 (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.017)** (0.020)** 
ROA -0.216 -0.203 -0.204 -0.203 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Market to book 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.035)** (0.053)* (0.054)* (0.053)* 
Log(market value) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.732) (0.429) (0.433) (0.444) 
Asset growth 0.070 0.074 0.074 0.074 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Institutional ownership -0.042 -0.050 -0.048 -0.050 
 (0.046)** (0.038)** (0.044)** (0.036)** 
Book leverage -0.034 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.067)* (0.127) (0.133) (0.128) 
Independent board (0,1) indicator -0.002    
 (0.715)    
% independent directors on the audit committee  0.016   
  (0.309)   
Independent auditing committee (0,1) indicator   -0.001  
   (0.919)  
100% independent directors on the auditing committee (0,1) indicator    0.008 
    (0.269) 
Observations 6665 5454 5456 5456 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 
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CEO incentive and earnings management 
Previous studies, such as Peasnell et al. (2005), have documented that board directors 
help constrain earnings management, while Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) show that 
firms with high CEO incentive pay are likely to be involved in high levels of earnings 
management. Table 18 presents univariate analysis of CEO incentives on earnings 
management conditioning on the director incentive. I assign firm into three terciles after 
sorting on director incentive. Within each director incentive tercile, I further segmented the 
data into three sub-terciles after sorting on the CEO incentive pay, which is measured as the 
proportion of CEO option compensation over the CEO total compensation. The result shows 
that when director incentive pay is in the low or median tercile, there is no significant 
difference in earnings management between the high CEO tercile and the low CEO tercile 
subgroups. However, when the director incentive is in the high tercile, the differences in the 
earnings management between the high CEO incentive tercile and low CEO incentive tercile 
subgroups is about 0.053, which is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000. This 
evidence that CEO incentive pay has an impact on earnings management only when director 
incentive is high, lends support to the notion that the directors are more likely to form an 
alliance with CEO in manipulating earnings.  
 
Table 18 Univariate test: directors’ incentives and earnings management: 
Controlling for CEO incentives 
  Absolute Discretional Accruals 
  Low Director Incentive 
 (1) (2) 
Low Tercile CEO Incentive 0.089 0.078 
High Tercile CEO Incentive 0.081 0.084 
Difference 0.008 -0.006 
P-Value (0.778) (0.280) 
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Table 18 Univariate test: directors’ incentives and earnings management: 
Controlling for CEO incentives (continue) 
 
  Median Director Incentive 
Low Tercile CEO Incentive 0.104 0.077 
High Tercile CEO Incentive 0.094 0.084 
Difference 0.010 -0.007 
P-Value (0.755) (0.202) 
  High Director Incentive 
Low Tercile CEO Incentive 0.115 0.091 
High Tercile CEO Incentive 0.168 0.149 
Difference -0.053 -0.058 
P-Value (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
 
To further address the concern on the effect of director incentive on constraining 
CEO’s earnings manipulation. I sort the sample into three terciles by the CEO incentive and 
then run the main regressions discussed in Section 3.2. The result is not reported for the sake 
of brevity, the coefficients of director incentives are only statistically significant for the 
subsample where CEO incentive is at the top terciles. When CEO incentives are at lower or 
middle tercile, director incentives are not significant. This confirms that the director 
incentive affects earnings management only when CEO incentive and director incentive are 
high. 
Further, I add two control variables: high director incentive high CEO incentive 
dummy and low director incentive high CEO incentive dummy. As shown in table 18, the 
result indicates that although the director incentive is still significantly positive, but the 
group of the company year having high directors incentive and high CEO incentives have 
significantly larger absolute abnormal discretional accruals while the group with high CEO 
incentive low director incentive are significantly indifferent from the other groups with low 
CEO incentives in terms of earnings management. This result suggests is consistent with our 
universal test. The CEO incentive does affect the firm’s abnormal discretional accruals when 
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coupled with high directors’ incentives award to the board directors. 
 
Table 19 Directors incentives and earnings management: 
Controlling for CEO incentives 
 Dependent variables: Absolute discretional accrual 
Director incentive 0.036 
  (0.007)*** 
Low Director Incentive X High CEO Incentive 0.002 
  (0.748) 
High Director Incentive X High CEO Incentive 0.019 
  (0.064)* 
ROA -0.273 
  (0.000)*** 
Market to book 0.007 
  (0.016)** 
Log(sales) -0.001 
  (0.839) 
Asset growth 0.085 
  (0.000)*** 
Institutional ownership -0.046 
  (0.083)* 
Book leverage -0.07 
  (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.243 
  (0.000)*** 
Observations 6670 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 
 
Controlling for self selection bias 
The tests thus far show that director incentive pay has a positive, significant 
relationship with the degree of earnings management. However, the sample only includes 
those firms that pay stock options to their directors and, thus, excludes firms that do not pay 
their directors any stock options. Therefore, the previous findings could be attributed to the 
lack of control for selection bias, which may exist, because the decision to pay the directors 
stock options is not random. For instance, a firm that is involved in high earnings 
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management would be likely to pay its directors stock options and therefore, based on the 
sample criteria, it would be included in the sample. The director incentive effect on earnings 
management could be distorted without controlling for self-selection biases. To address this 
issue, I first conduct a univariate test by comparing earning management across the 
subsample of firms that pay their directors with stock options and firms that do not award 
any options at all.  
 
Table 20 Earnings management for incentive vs. no incentive paid companies 
  Absolute discretional accrual 
  N Mean Median 
Incentive paid companies 6837 0.109 0.042 
Non-incentive paid companies 1894 0.084 0.034 
Difference  0.026 0.008 
    (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
 
As shown in Table 20, there are 1894 firm-year observations with no incentive pay to 
directors. When I compare the average earnings management between these two groups, I 
see that non-incentive paying companies have mean absolute discretional accruals of 0.088 
in contrast to 0.119 for the incentive paying companies. The difference of the mean absolute 
discretional accruals is statistically significant as supported by a t-statistic of 3.144. Looking 
at the median value of the absolute discretional accrual also leads to the same conclusion. 
The median absolute discretional accrual is 0.042 for incentive paying firms and the median 
absolute discretional accrual for non incentive paying companies is 0.034. 
To address the self-selection bias issue, we use a two-stage Heckman selection model 
that controls for the probability of a firm paying directors incentive compensation. The first 
stage is a probit regression to estimate the probability of the firm awarding the directors with 
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a stock option plan. The predicted probability of paying incentive options obtained from the 
first stage regression will be added as a control variable in the second stage regression. 
In the first stage probit regression, the dependent variable is an incentive paid dummy 
that is equal to one if the firm pays directors incentive pay, or zero otherwise. Following 
Fich and Shivdasani (2005), I include the following control variables that could help explain 
the firm’s decision to award directors with stock options: board independence dummy, the 
natural logarithm of one plus the annual retainer, new CEO dummy, CEO of retirement age 
dummy, an indicator of whether the directors receive a pension plan, percentage of directors 
who are CEOs in other firms, CEO-chairman dummy, dividend yield, market adjusted stock 
return for the last 12 months and the natural logarithm of sales. The results, shown in Table 
21, indicate that , the firm is more likely to pay directors with stock options when it has a 
more independent board, the director annual retainer is high, and the CEO is new and at 
retirement age. This result is consistent with the findings of Fich and Shivdasani (2005). 
Directors are reluctant to adopt stock option plan in their compensation package as the stock 
option will make their portfolio less diversified and thus more risky. When the cash-based 
annual retainer is high, the board is more likely to adopt the stock option plan. The more 
independent the board, implying less insider ownership, the more likely it is to adopt the 
stock option plan. But when the CEO also chairs the board, the board is less likely to adopt 
the stock option plan.  This result is not in conflict with the relationship between board 
effectiveness and earnings management. It shows that more independent boards are more 
likely to adopt the stock option plan, but we fail to conclude that independent boards lead to 
severe earnings management. Thus, our study is not inconsistent with some other studies 
have shown that independent boards can help reduce earnings management (for example, see 
Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008)).  
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The second stage regression test includes previously employed control variables and 
the predicted probability to pay directors incentive compensation from the first stage 
regression as a new control variable. The coefficient of the fitted value of director incentive 
is still strongly significant. Moreover, compared to our previous results, the coefficient has 
increased from 0.023 to 0.043, which is about 100% larger in magnitude. The predicted 
probability of incentive pay is significant but with a positive sign, which is consistent with 
the univariate analysis findings. The results show that firms without incentive pay, on 
average, have lower earnings management than those firms which paid directors with 
incentive compensation. In addition, the lambda statistics from the selection model has a 
negative coefficient of -0.095 and significant at 0.000 level, which indicates that selection 
biases exists and the result has a downward biases without controlling the firm’s probability 
to pay directors incentive compensation. This self-selection test supports our result that the 
earnings management is more severe when the directors receive incentive compensation 
even after we control the factors that affect the firm’s decision to provide incentive 
compensation, the coefficient of director incentive compensation variable moves up from 
0.02 to 0.043.  
 
Table 21 Earnings management for incentive vs. no incentive paid companies: 
self selection analysis 
  Dependent variable: Absolute discretional accrual 
  First stage (Incentive paid dummy) Second stage 
Director incentives  0.043 
  (0.000)*** 
ROA  -0.266 
  (0.000)*** 
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Table 21 Earnings management for incentive vs. no incentive paid companies: 
self selection analysis (continue) 
Market to book  0.007 
  (0.000)*** 
Log(market value)  0.001 
  (0.685) 
Asset growth  0.073 
  (0.000)*** 
Institutional ownership  -0.032 
  (0.066)* 
Book leverage  -0.053 
  (0.000)*** 
Predicted incentive paid (0,1) indicator  0.143 
  (0.000)*** 
Independent board (0,1)indicator 0.247  
 (0.000)***  
Log(1+annual retainer) 0.124  
 (0.000)***  
New CEO 0.147  
 (0.017)**  
CEO of retirement age 0.185  
 (0.000)***  
Pension plan to director -0.063  
 (0.279)  
Percentage of directors who are CEOs of other 
firm 0.280  
 (0.052)*  
CEO chairs the board -0.111  
 (0.002)***  
Dividend yield -0.133  
 (0.615)  
Market adjust 12-month stock return 0.023  
 (0.337)  
Log(sales) -0.067  
 (0.000)***  
Lambda statistics -0.095  
 (0.000)***  
Observations 8533 8533 
 
Earnings management and directors option sale 
The evidence thus far is consistent with the notion that director incentive pay inhibits 
the director’s monitoring effectiveness and thus leads to higher level of earnings 
management. Next, I investigate whether directors understand and take advantage of the high 
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earnings management activity of the firm. I collect information on directors’ options sale for 
the year t+1 for all sample firms. The dependent variable is total director options realized in 
year t+1. The control variables are a high-earnings management dummy that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm’s earnings management is in the top tercile in year t, change of cash flow 
(#308), market return and log(sales). In the first column of Table 10, the coefficient for the 
high-earnings management dummy is 0.067, significant at the 5% level.  When all other 
control variables are included, the coefficient is 0.059, significant at the 10% level.  This 
finding indicates that for firms with earnings management level in the top tercile in the 
previous year, the current year directors’ options realization increases by approximately 0.06 
to 0.07.   
 
Table 22 Earnings management and insider sell 
  Directors Option Sell Directors Option Sell 
Absolute discretional accruals (Top Tercile) 0.059 0.067 
 (0.060)* (0.049)** 
Stock market return -0.008  
 (0.701)  
Change of cash flow 0.288  
 (0.095)*  
Log(sales) -0.127  
 (0.000)***  
Observations 2194 2196 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.05 
 
Additional robustness tests 
Given the small time variation of the director incentive, it is reasonable to assume 
that firms are less likely to change the structure of the board compensation. I therefore 
employ in my analysis the cumulative change of director incentives over a three year period 
from year t-3 to year t. As shown in Table 23, the dependent variable is the change of 
earnings management from year t-3 to year t, and all independent variables are also 
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measured as changes over the same period. As in Table 4, I use year and industry dummies 
to control for time and industry effects, but their coefficients are not reported for the sake of 
brevity. The number of observations drops to 3195 and the overall R-square drops to 17% 
from 22% in Table 4. The coefficient of director incentives is 0.07, which is about 3.5 times 
of the corresponding coefficient in Table 4 and strongly significant at the 1% level. The 
significance for the other variables is retained except for the coefficient of the change in 
institutional ownership, which becomes insignificant.  
 
Table 23 Cumulative change of director incentives and earnings management 
  Dependent variable: change of absolute discretional accrual 
Change of director incentive 0.072 
 (0.002)*** 
Change of ROA -0.172 
 (0.211) 
Change of market to book 0.008 
 (0.079)* 
Change of log(market value) -0.032 
 (0.005)*** 
Change of asset growth 0.156 
 (0.000)*** 
Change of institutional ownership -0.026 
 (0.645) 
Change of book leverage -0.103 
 (0.011)** 
Observations 3195 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 
 
The results are robust to other sample and model specifications. For example, Table 
24 focuses on a subsample of firms with independent boards, i.e., firms for which 51% or 
more of the board directors are independent. The regression result, presented in column 1 in 
Table 11 shows that director incentive pay affects earnings management even when the 
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majority of the board are independent directors. This relationship is significant at the 1% 
level. Second, I include in the sample only firms with an independent auditing committee, 
i.e., firms for which 51% or more of the auditing committee members are independent 
directors. The purpose of excluding all firms without an independent auditing committee is 
to re-test the relationship for a subset of firms which potentially have a less severe earnings 
management problem. Again, the director incentive variable is positive and significant at the 
1% level.  Thus, these results indicate that whether a board is independent or not does not 
materially change the relationship between director incentive pay and earnings management. 
 
Table 24 Director incentives and earnings management: sub-samples 
  Dependent variables: Absolute discretional accrual 
  (1) (2) 
Director incentive 0.043 0.029 
 (0.000)*** (0.003)*** 
ROA -0.213 -0.210 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Market to book 0.005 0.005 
 (0.036)** (0.036)** 
Log(market value) -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.874) (0.572) 
Asset growth 0.049 0.063 
 (0.008)*** (0.000)*** 
Institutional ownership -0.046 -0.048 
 (0.064)* (0.020)** 
Book leverage -0.022 -0.035 
 (0.316) (0.066)* 
Observations 5026 6262 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.21 
 
I consider alternative measures of earnings management and directors incentive pay. 
In the Table 25, column 1, I use the absolute discretional accrue estimated as Jone’s model. 
In column 2 and 3, I used a standardized director incentive measure instead of measuring 
director incentive in percentage terms. For the sake of brevity, I do not report the coefficients 
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for other control variables. Table 12 shows that the result remains robust. For one standard 
deviation change of director incentive, the absolute discretional accrual would change by 
0.8%. Economically, this number is not small given that the average total asset is about 
4,690 million dollars in the sample.  A 0.8% percentage change means that 37.52 million 
dollars change of absolute discretional accruals. 
 
Table 25 Directors incentives and earnings management: alternative measures 
  Dependent variables: Absolute discretional accrual 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Director incentive 0.024   
 (0.017)**   
Director incentive (standardized)  0.008 0.008 
  (0.017)** (0.017)** 
    
Observations 6665 6665 6665 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper finds that director incentive compensation has a positive and significant 
relationship with the level of the firms’ earnings management. To identify the effect of the 
director incentive on firm’s earnings management, I employ a series of tests that control for 
self selection and provide robust evidence using alternative earnings management and 
directors compensation measures. This paper contributes to two strands of research. First, 
while some policymakers and researchers believe that incentive compensation for directors 
may lead to an alignment of their interest with that of the stockholders, this paper shows that 
high incentive pay may lead to a higher degree of earnings management. Second, previous 
studies show that high CEO incentive pay would lead to high earning management, but they 
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fail to control for director incentives. I find that after controlling for director incentives, it 
becomes apparent that CEO incentives lead to higher earning manipulation levels only if 
directors’ incentive pay is high as well.   
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